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Appendix A:  
Comments by Rob Reich1 
Can Charitable Compensation Diminish Complicity? 
 
Thomas Pogge’s prize-winning paper presents an argument for the ar-
resting claim that the great suffering and needs of the global poor constitute 
for citizens of developed countries not merely a humanitarian obligation 
but something far worse: a collaboratively imposed evil. Or less dramatical-
ly: a massive, foreseeable, and preventable injustice. Because the numbers 
of the poor are so large and because our role in creating and sustaining 
desperate poverty is allegedly causal – by collaboratively imposing upon 
the poor a set of unjust global institutions – the rights violations we wealthy 
citizens of advanced industrialized countries perpetrate are are gargantuan 
and barbaric, almost certainly the worst in human history. Pogge says that 
we – that you and I – are guilty of violating the human rights of the poor. 
I’ll suppose that Pogge’s controversial argument goes through, and I’ll 
examine what the argument implies for how we can fulfill our duty not to 
violate the human rights of the world’s poor. At the end of his paper, Pogge 
writes “We have a duty not to collaborate in the design or imposition of so-
cial institutions that foreseeably cause a human rights deficit that is reason-
ably avoidable through better institutions – unless we fully compensate for 
our fair share of the avoidable human rights deficit.”2 He argues that we 
can avoid sharing responsibility for the human rights violations by donat-
ing money to effective aid organizations. I contest this conclusion. 
 
POGGE’S ARGUMENT IS CORRECT; NOW WHAT? 
 
Let us accept Pogge’s main argument that we are indeed violating the 
human rights of the world’s poor. The reason: we collaboratively design 
and impose supranational institutional arrangements that we intend, fore-
see, or should foresee, will avoidably deprive human beings of secure ac-
                                            
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, Stanford University. 
2. Thomas Pogge, Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?, 14:2 YALE HUM. RTS. 
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cess to their human rights. What are we to do? How can we reduce or elim-
inate – to borrow a phrase from Eric Beerbohm’s recent book, In Our Name: 
the ethics of democracy3 – our “complicity footprint?” 
In a brief final section of his paper, Pogge gives three possible answers.  
First, he says that citizens of Western states should commit themselves to 
collective political or social action so that politicians will act to reform su-
pranational institutions in such a way as to eliminate the human rights vio-
lations of the world’s poor. Pogge observes that there is no such citizen ma-
jority in any democracy that would bring about such reform and that the 
prospects for creating social movements to create such a majority are negli-
gible. So second, Pogge suggests that citizens “could emigrate to one of the 
poorer countries, thereby disconnecting themselves from their erstwhile 
country’s policies and marginally weakening this country.”4 But Pogge real-
izes how unlikely this is to occur, and anyway claims that there is “a far 
better way for citizens to avoid sharing responsibility for the human rights 
violations their government is committing in their name.”5 So third, Pogge 
says individuals can compensate for their fair share of the avoidable human 
rights deficit. They can do this by donating money to effective international 
aid agencies or non-governmental organizations, and Pogge offers some 
tentative suggestions about just how much money to give. Pogge says an 
individual who compensates in this way avoids sharing responsibility for the 
human rights violations her government is committing in her name. 
I have two points to make.  First, I dispute Pogge’s second and third op-
tions. I argue that emigration can be morally cowardly rather than heroic, 
and I reject the assertion that compensation can be a mechanism to avoid 
shared responsibility for the human rights violations. Compensating the 
poor may be morally desirable, even obligatory, but that compensation by 
itself reduces or eliminates our complicity footprint seems to me a mistake. 
Second, I question Pogge’s apparent attribution of roughly equal responsi-
bility for human rights violations to most citizens. I call attention to the 
model of shared responsibility that animates Pogge’s view and I suggest 
better alternatives. 
 
POGGE’S THREE OPTIONS 
What should citizens of the United States or the European Union make 
of Pogge’s three options of what to do in the face of their considerable com-
plicity footprint in violating the human rights of the global poor. My view 
is that what follows from Pogge’s argument is a duty to act politically, to 
try and bring about institutional change, his first option. We have a primary 
duty to pursue justice, where justice is construed as the establishment of 
                                            
3. ERIC BEERBOHM, IN OUR NAME: THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY (2012). 
4. Pogge, supra note 2, at 31. 
5. Id. at 32. 
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just global institutions that eliminate any causal contribution to desperate 
global poverty. On this score, Pogge agrees. What I dispute is the claim that 
the emigration or the compensation options follow from his argument. 
Consider first the emigration option. Pogge sees emigration as a means 
to exculpate oneself from complicity in the human rights violations of one’s 
country. Where governments act in our name, and when we cannot suc-
cessfully bring about political reform, we can renounce membership in our 
homeland and thereby eliminate our individual responsibility. Recogniz-
ing, however, the personal cost of emigrating, Pogge seems to view such an 
act as morally heroic. But I think it possible to see emigration more as a self-
interested and ineffective act of moral cowardice. It represents an effort to 
cleanse one’s own hands while leaving wholly intact the very system that 
dirtied them in the first place. Emigration does nothing to improve the condition 
of the poor. At best, it is a symbolic act, signaling to one’s fellow citizens the 
injustice that one refuses to have committed in one’s own name. 
A magnificent short story by Ursula LeGuin,“The Ones Who Walk 
Away From Omelas” illustrates my point.6 LeGuin imagines a supremely 
happy small town, Omelas. It is a utopia, but the maintenance of its utopian 
state depends on the imprisonment and neglect of an innocent child, kept in 
a prison cell beneath the city. If anyone ever helps the child, the utopian 
character of the city disappears instantaneously. The citizens of Omelas 
have a festival once a year to celebrate their great happiness. The festival 
requires them visually to acknowledge the child in the underground cell 
and confront the terms of their city’s social contract. The story’s final sen-
tences – and its title – refer to the few people who every year walk away 
from Omelas after the festival, renouncing their happiness because of the 
injustice of the foundation on which it is built. Are the ones who walk away 
heroes or cowards? LeGuin does not say, but I view them as cowards, for 
they do nothing to change the condition of the child, nothing to alter the 
fundamental injustice of the city.  Perhaps we should view Pogge’s emi-
grants in the same way. 
Emigration does not alter the institutional arrangements that produce 
the injustice and elevates the moral purity of the individual over the admit-
tedly messy and uncertain efforts of collective action, political movement 
building, and actual reform or transformation of institutional arrangements. 
In Pogge’s terms, emigration creates interactional innocence by fully de-
taching oneself from the unjust institutional arrangements. But why should 
we prefer interactional innocence that simply leaves intact the unjust ar-
rangements and, more to the point, the very harms that these institutional 
arrangements cause to the poor? There is a case to be made for remaining in 
Omelas, not emigrating in order to undertake long-term, highly uncertain, 
political movement building.  
Perhaps Pogge would accept this. Do not emigrate and avail oneself of 
what he calls a better way to avoid sharing responsibility for human rights 
                                            
6. URSULA LEGUIN, THE ONES WHO WALK AWAY FROM OMELAS (1993). 
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violations. Pay a fair share to compensate for the harms caused by the insti-
tutional arrangements sustained by one’s country and carried out in one’s 
name. What then of the compensation option? 
Unlike the emigration option, I do not dispute that compensation is a 
morally recommendable, even obligatory, act. What I reject is the claim that 
compensation is sufficient, on its own and on Pogge’s own terms, to avoid 
sharing responsibility for the human rights violations in the first place. Com-
pensation may be desirable because it holds out the humanitarian promise 
of improving the welfare of severely poor people. But compensation does 
not diminish or excuse culpability for the injustice of the institutional ar-
rangements imposed in one’s name. Pogge too quickly leaps to the conclu-
sion that financial compensation could enable citizens to avoid shared re-
sponsibility. In a nutshell, Pogge mistakenly asks charity to correct an 
injustice. 
The compensation option is in deep tension with Pogge’s most im-
portant claim, namely that we are guilty of massive institutional injustice in 
harming the poor. Pogge suggests that an individual charitable or philan-
thropic act (even if obligatory, not voluntary) can compensate for or miti-
gate an institutional injustice, that charity is the appropriate exculpating re-
sponse to one’s responsibility for injustice. 
Consider several reasons why compensation is a problematic option.  
First, Pogge’s own views about official development aid suggest a 
problem with individual fair share compensation. Pogge says of develop-
ment aid that it is “neither cost-effective nor sustainable” (30). Why should 
we believe anything different about individual compensation? 
Second, Pogge’s compensation scheme is mismatched with demands of 
justice, with the negative duty not to impose harms on others. I fail to see 
how payment to any international nongovernmental organization that will 
help alleviate severe poverty can ever undo the injustice of what caused the 
poverty in the first place. Fair share compensation temporarily improves 
the condition of the desperately poor, leaving fully intact the collaborative-
ly imposed institutional injustice that will, over time, continue to cause vio-
late the rights of the poor and do so in a way that will culpably implicate 
the donor, for these injustices will continue to be carried out in his name. 
Pogge wrongly asks charity to act in the register of justice. 
I think of the parable of the wealthy man who is riding on the back of a 
poor man, causing the poor man to be slower, causing him not to be able to 
walk as far or as long as others. People all around ask what’s wrong with 
the poor man, why he is so slow. They take pity on him. So too does the 
wealthy man on his back. The wealthy man keeps offering to mop his brow 
and give him a drink of water. But what the poor man actually needs is for 
the wealthy man to get off his back. Giving the poor man water improves 
his welfare but does not diminish the wealthy man’s culpability for being 
on the poor man’s back in the first place. 
Perhaps Pogge would resist the accusation that he views charity as a 
suitable substitute for justice.  Perhaps he views fair share compensation 
4
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not as charity but as a form of reparative justice, where individuals aim to 
do their part to repair the harms done by the collaboratively imposed glob-
al institutional regime. 
I doubt, however, that the concept of reparative justice can gain traction 
in the case of global poverty. Reparative justice aspires to restore victims to 
a pre-harm baseline, but no individual compensation can restore all victims 
to a pre-harm baseline. More important, no individual contribution con-
strued as reparative justice would reform the humans-rights-violating, col-
laborative imposed unjust institutional regime. Therefore, despite the fair 
share compensation, the policies carried out in one’s name, and for which 
citizens share responsibility, will continue to cause global poverty. Com-
pensation does not attack the root cause of poverty but merely temporarily 
relieves the desperate condition of those very badly off. In short, fair share 
compensation does not seem capable of restoring victims to a pre-harm 
baseline.7 
Third, endorsing compensation pulls individuals away from their first 
and primary duty to act politically, even in the face of uncertain success 
and long time horizons for change. Citizens confront opportunity costs in 
their finite time and financial resources, so allocating these to compensation 
comes into inevitable tension with political organizing for institutional re-
form. Rather than compensating, why not give one’s fair share to a domes-
tic political organization agitating for institutional change, to a candidate 
who pledges to attempt to reform supranational institutions? By endorsing 
compensation as a fully responsibility-eliminating action, Pogge provides a 
reason for citizens who face opportunity costs in allocating their time and 
money with reason to opt for compensation over attempts at political re-
form because compensation is allegedly a fully responsibility-eliminating 
option.  
Consider a citizen who, in her political activity, votes for a politician 
who does nothing to push for reforming the unjust supranational institu-
tions that cause a significant amount of severe global poverty. She shares 
responsibility, on Pogge’s account, for the human rights violations of the 
severely poor. She is riding on the back of the poor, actively harming them. 
But she is moved by their plight and mops their brow by donating a signifi-
cant amount of money to effective NGOs that aim to alleviate poverty. She 
fails to act politically to overcome the problem, yet she does act purposeful-
ly as an individual to alleviate poverty. Pogge appears to think this citizen 
no longer shares responsibility for the human rights violations. But giving 
private charity does not relieve an individual from the duty to oppose un-
just institutions, does not relieve an individual of the shared responsibility 
for the harms caused by these unjust institutions. 
Or consider a slightly different case. Imagine a second citizen who pays 
her fair share of compensation and yet votes for politicians whom she 
                                            
7. I leave aside the additional objection that determining the pre-harm baseline condition of the 
global poor is an impossible task. But without such a specification, calculating fair share con-
tributions is likewise impossible. 
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knows will oppose reform of the supranational institutions that cause pov-
erty. Pogge appears to think this citizen exculpates herself as equally as the 
first citizen. But I think this must be false, for the second citizen fails in her 
duty to aim for political reform. The second citizen is a walking contradic-
tion. 
So I reject the claim that compensation morally exculpates. At best, it is 
a second-best or third-best response to the injustice of the global poor. En-
dorsing compensation as an exculpating response to injustice is to commit, 
as John Stuart Mill put it, “the great error of reformers and philanthropists . 
. . to nibble at the consequences of unjust power, instead of redressing the 
injustice itself.”8 
 
DIFFERENTIAL COMPLICITY FOOTPRINTS 
The discussion of the two citizens above leads me to my final point. I 
think these two citizens, in light of their different political engagements and 
attitudes, are differentially responsible. They share responsibility for the 
human rights violations of the poor, but not equally. If compensation is re-
quired of them, their fair shares are not only a function, as Pogge argues, of 
their per capita income, but also of their different levels of responsibility. 
I can’t discern Pogge’s stance on this because he appears to endorse a 
simple understanding of what it means to share responsibility as a citizen 
of a developed country for collaboratively imposing an unjust supranation-
al institutional regime. Pogge excuses children and the domestic poor. But 
otherwise all are complicit. This shared responsibility arises, it seems, for 
reasons no more complicated than that one is a citizen of such a country, 
that one is associated with and thereby implicated in the policies of a coun-
try in virtue of one’s status as a citizen. We act wrongly, more or less con-
tinuously, by membership alone. 
The assignment of blame for violating the human rights of the global 
poor cannot be placed upon such a crude structure. Citizens may have dif-
ferent complicity footprints. If there are compensation requirements, they 
cannot flow from considerations just of one’s income.  
 
Consider the following possibilities: 
 
1. A citizen jointly intends with fellow citizens to bring about or sustain 
global institutional injustice by voting for politicians who support the objec-
tionable institutional regime and by supporting domestic and global poli-
cies consistent with it. These are people akin to segregationists in the South 
who use political means to maintain domination over blacks. 
 
2. A citizen does not intend to bring about or sustain the institutional in-
                                            
8. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1848). 
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justice but votes for a politician who sponsors or supports the institutional 
injustice. The citizen never intended the injustice but understood herself to 
be delegating responsibility for decisionmaking about supranational insti-
tutional design to the politician. 
 
3. A citizen does not intend to bring about or sustain the institutional 
injustice; she intends the opposite and votes in favor of a politician who 
would act on Pogge’s argument to correct this injustice. But this politician 
loses and a rival politician who supports the objectionable institutional re-
gime wins. (Can this citizen say “Don’t blame me?”) 
 
4.  A citizen does not intend to bring about or sustain the institutional 
injustice; she intends the opposite and votes in favor of a politician who 
aims to correct the injustice; she also campaigns and agitates through civil 
society to create a political movement to correct the injustice. She donates 
money and time to a political organization that champions Pogge-preferred 
policies. Yet still the justice-promoting politician loses and there is no polit-
ical majority in support of better institutional design. 
 
5. A citizen neither intends to bring about or sustain the institutional in-
justice or to end it. She is ignorant of the matter. She votes if she pleases. 
She has never read Pogge. 
 
I think the complicity footprints of these citizens are different. I can’t 
tell if Pogge thinks these citizens are identically liable. 
We need, I suggest, an account of shared responsibility in a democratic 
country where the behavior of politicians who act in our name is sensitive 
to the individual actions undertaken by citizens in their capacity as citizens, 
in their appropriately political efforts to correct injustices that are indeed 
carried out in their name. I conclude by asking: does Pogge believe he 
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